Fredrik Stenbeck
Klarhet där teknik, resiliens och verklighet möts.
Rådgivare och talare. Grundare Barrikad .
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Fler notiser →Försvarshögskolan har lanserat Påverkanslabbet, som är en "forskningsnära plattform om otillbörlig informationspåverkan och hur vi tillsammans kan förstå, känna igen och motverka den". Allt som kan hjälpa oss medborgare med kunskap så vi ökar vår motståndskraft om informationspåverkan är toppen.
Ett fascinerande illustrativt reportage från Reuters om hur slagfältet ser ut i Ukraina. När det gamla (skyttegravar) och det nya (drönare och det transaprenta slagfältet) möts på ett väldigt skrämamande sätt. Baserat på verkliga berättelser, video-upptagningar och djupanalys.
- notis
Regeringen har beslutat om en ny molnpolicy för att bättre stärka säkerheten, minska beroenden och ge bättre kontroll över data. Låter toppen. Dock är inte policyn i sig publicerad än, så jag blir nog en post när den är publicerad.
Kan inte låta bli att ibland tänka tillbaka på att Storbritannien och Frankrike var en dag från att invadera Sverige under 2:a världskriget. Plannen var att den 10 April 1940 gå in i Sverige för att dels stoppa leveranserna av järnmalm till Tyskland samt sätta stopp för tyska trupptransporter genom Sverige. Tanken var även att anfalla Tyskland norrifrån. Nu gick Tyskland in i Danmark den 9 april och planerna gick om intet, tack och lov.
Singapore saknar naturtillgångar och har istället använt finanssektorn, tech och data som substitut. Nu har Singapore identifierat att de kan fungera som neutral mark i AI-kampen mellan USA och Kina. Reuters skriver intressant om det.
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Varje eller varannan vecka skriver jag ett nyhetsbrev, prenumerera gärna. GDPR
Intressanta rapporter
Fler rapporter →Nätverket "Holiday"- ett exempel på hur AI används för otillbörlig informationspåverkan
Myndigheten för Psykologiskt Försvar / MPF
Denna rapport från Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar (MPF) belyser två aktuella företeelser som delvis hänger ihop och förstärker varandra: utvecklingen av desinformation som tjänst och framväxten av botnätverk som drivs eller förstärks med hjälp av AI.
Counter-FIMI: The Case for Disrupting Hostile Actors
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
This report provides an up-to-date assessment of interventions intended to disrupt Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and suggests how practitioners might make more informed decisions about using them. It aims to enhance practitioners’ understanding of how to disrupt FIMI operations and why they should do so. It addresses three main questions: What role can, or should, disruptive measures play in counter-FIMI operations? How effective are disruptive responses in countering FIMI? How can decision-makers better understand context in order to determine whether and how to disrupt FIMI operations? The report also summarises existing research on counter-FIMI in the areas of situational awareness, building societal resilience, communicative responses and cooperation. As it will explain, beyond fact-checking and media literacy, evidence of most counter-FIMI measures remains limited. However, several principles are widely accepted. These include the importance of strong situational awareness to identify and track FIMI campaigns; the need for a ‘whole of society’ or ‘multi-stakeholder’ response in which governments, platforms, media outlets and civil society cooperate, and the need to avoid a binary distinction between foreign and domestic influence.
Nationell strategi för psykologiskt försvar
Försvarsdepartementet
Regeringens nya nationella strategi för psykologiskt försvar ger en gemensam riktning för hur hela samhället ska stärka sin förmåga att förebygga, upptäcka och hantera otillbörlig informationspåverkan och andra hybridhot.
Nationell strategi för försörjningsberedskap
Försvarsdepartementet
Regeringen har beslutat om Sveriges första nationella strategi för försörjningsberedskap. Syftet med strategin är att tydliggöra inriktningen för arbetet med försörjningsberedskap och formerna för samverkan mellan offentliga och privata aktörer inom totalförsvaret.
EU response to hybrid threats
European Parliamentary Research Service
Hybrid threats against the EU have increased significantly in both frequency and sophistication, creating complex challenges for European security, democratic institutions and societal resilience. Malicious state and non-state actors combine political, economic, cyber, information and military tools to exploit vulnerabilities, undermine public trust and destabilise societies, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. The EU and its Member States have gradually transformed their understanding of hybrid threats into concrete policies, operational capabilities and coordinated response mechanisms. The EU approach combines preventive, protective and reactive measures, including intelligence cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, sanctions regimes, resilience building and strategic communication. Recent incidents involving cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and EU airspace violations have further accelerated the development of EU-level instruments designed to detect, deter and respond to these malign activities. As security challenges increasingly overlap across civilian and military domains, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aim to ensure complementarity between the EU's regulatory and civilian tools and NATO's defence and military capabilities through improving coordination and enhancing situational awareness. The European Parliament emphasises that hybrid threats, mainly from Russia, China and Belarus, represent an escalating security challenge for the EU, and calls for a comprehensive EU response, stronger EU–NATO coordination, enhanced resilience and civil preparedness, targeted countermeasures, and closer cooperation with partner countries.
Wide Awake in a World of Disorder
FOI
Geopolitical turbulence: 2026 stands out not as a year of certainty, but one in which volatility itself has become the new normal. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has entered its fifth year, underscoring the persistence of instabil- ity in Europe’s security environment. Developments ranging from the Greenland crisis to the war in Iran have contributed to increasingly strained transatlantic re- lations. The war in Iran has intensified global concerns over supply-chain security and energy prices, highlighting the deep interconnections between regional crises and the broader international order. At the same time, technological develop- ments in areas such as agentic AI; autonomy, including in robotics; and increased interconnectivity are profoundly affecting our societies, the world economy, and the nature of warfare.
EU:s väg mot ett starkt psykologiskt försvar
Myndigheten för Psykologiskt Försvar / MPF
Otillbörlig informationspåverkan har blivit en allt viktigare säkerhets och demokratifråga inom EU. Samtidigt är området komplext, med många aktörer, regelverk och parallella initiativ. Hittills har det saknats en samlad svensk överblick över EU arbete på området. Rapporten EU väg mot ett starkt psykologiskt försvar beskriver hur EU arbete mot otillbörlig informationspåverkan har utvecklats sedan 2015, från tidiga insatser mot desinformation till dagens bredare arbete med FIMI, digital reglering, demokratisk motståndskraft och säkerhetspolitik.
The Digital Leviathan: Prediction, Politics and Police Power in POL-INTEL
IT University of Copenhagen
In this digital era, police forces across the globe are turning to cutting-edge data analytics for the purpose of enacting more efficient police power through predicting and pre-empting crime. In Denmark, allegedly one of the most digitalized countries in the world, the police have turned to the American firm Palantir Technologies to produce a platform named POL-INTEL to integrate, analyze and visualize mass amounts of data from different data bases. For the Danish national police, this platform was heralded as a “super weapon” with predictive policing capacities that would represent a “quantum leap” into the future of law enforcement. For critics, POL-INTEL has been branded a tool of mass surveillance. With this background in mind, this thesis asks two questions: How is police power imagined and enacted in the digital era? And how is governance over the police materialized in relation to data-driven policing?
A world of Palantir: Ontological politics in the Danish police’s POL-INTEL
IT University of Copenhagen
When Palantir Technologies customized the Gotham platform into POL-INTEL, a data integration and analysis platform purchased and used by the Danish police, it also enforced a new ontology that simultaneously shaped the police organization and policing practices. In this context, the concept of ontology should be understood in a twofold, albeit interconnected, way: it stands for its usual philosophical burden, but also refers to a centralized concept repository. In Computer Science, ontology refers to the basic concepts for how data is structured. Based on a series of interviews with Palantir engineers and police-officer users of POL-INTEL, this paper investigates what kind of politics, concepts, and bias in the form of data are inserted, processed and materialized in and by POL-INTEL’s ontology. We argue that POL-INTEL’s ontology is inherently political, as it is articulated by an assemblage of data, ideological positions, and economic concerns that are translated into the Danish context. POL-INTEL as a vector of platformization of police work also implies ideological choices with important consequences for the organizational life and accountability of law enforcement, establishing new distributions of skills between the platform and police officers.
AI-Assisted Analysis of War-Related Content on Grey Zone Domains
Psychological Defence Research Institute / Lunds Universitet
Imagine that you are a Russian intelligence operative tasked with spreading pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian content to international audiences. After almost four years of war, there is plentiful graphic footage that can be spun to show cruelty, bravery, cowardice or incompetence. Your challenge is not finding content but disseminating it. Western platforms like YouTube or Twitter (X) automatically remove or label gory footage. To varying degrees, ‘friendlier’ platforms like VK and Telegram offer a place for sharing war-related propaganda content, but not to mainstream EU audiences. There is, however, another option.